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EXPEDITED REMOVAL AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE
ASYLUM PROCESS: THE USE OF HLJMANITARIAN AID AS A
POLITICAL TOOL
In 1996 Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant ResponsibilityAct (IIRIRA).' Through this act, Congress
attempted to combat illegal immigration, while revamping the
asylum process in the United States.2 Some of the harshest new
measures were instituted under the "expedited removal" system.3
This system allows the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) to summarily exclude any alien who arrives at a border
without proper documents or with false travel documents.4 The
decision to exclude such an alien is not subject to review, thus
allowing low-level INS agents to make final decisions about the
admission of certain aliens.5
The IIRIRA was implemented as an attempt to stem the tide of
illegal immigration. Unfortunately, the law also harms true
asylum-seekers. Aliens without documents or with false documents
may be attempting to hide something from immigration officials,
but they may also have legitimate reasons for their lack of valid
documentation. 6 The absence of any effective review by the courts
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2000).
2. Katherine L. Vaughns, Retooling the "Refugee" Definition: The New Immigration
Reform Law's Impact on United States Domestic Asylum Policy, 1 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV.
41, 44-45 (1998).
3. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225.
4. Id. § 1225(c)(1)(A).
5. DanielC. Home, Summary Exclusion/ExpeditedRenoval, in INTRODUCINGTHE 1996
IMMIGRATION REFOI ACT 30, 31 (R. Patrick Murphy ed., 1996).
6. Many asylum-seekers flee from past or potential persecution and may have their
documents destroyed as a result of that persecution, or they may have falsified their
documents to prevent the rulers of their own country from discovering their intent to leave.
See, e.g., Cathleen Caron, News From the International War Crimes Tribunals: Asylum in
the United States: Expedited Removal Process Threatens to Violate International Norms, 6
HUIi. RTS. BRIEF 9, 27 (1999); Michele R. Pistone, Justice Delayed is Justice Denied: A
Proposal for Ending the Unnecessary Detention of Asylum-seekers, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
197, 200 n.13 (1999). In fact, "the very essence of being a refugee means fleeing for safety in
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could easily lead to a violation of international law's principle of
nonrefoulement,7 as well as other international law principles.
In addition to possible violations of international law, IIRIRA
gives too much power to immigration officials. The nature of
immigration law strictly -limits judicial review of immigration
decisions.8 The expedited removal system allows both INS officials
individually and the INS as a whole to grant or withhold asylum
on a discriminatory basis with no real checks on this power.
Proponents of this system argue that the majority of aliens subject
to the expedited removal system are not seeking asylum.' They also
assert that safeguards built into the system prevent accidental
return of true asylum-seekers.10 These explanations fail to take into
account the danger of a systematic refusal of all asylum-seekers
from a single country. This danger has increased since the events
of September 11, 2001, but has been present throughout the history
of United States refugee law. Such a danger does not stem from the
mistakes of low level immigration officials, but from the United
States' decision to use asylum as a political tool rather than for its
intended use: the protection of individuals from persecution.
a world where borders are sealed and where documents, however obtained, are a lifeline."
AMNESTYINTERNATIONAL USA, LOSTINTHE LABYRINTH: DETENTION OFASYLM [sic] SEEKERS
IN THE USA [hereinafter AMNESTY: LOST], available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/
rightsforall/asylum/ins/ins-03.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2002).
7. Nonrefoulement is the international law principle that says that a state may not
"expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion." Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176. See generally James E.
Crowe, Note, RunningAfoul of the Principle ofNon-Refoulement: Expedited Removal Under
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 291 (1999) (arguing that expedited removal does violate the principle of
nonrefoulement); Amy Langenfeld, Note, Living in Limbo: Mandatory Detention of
Immigrants Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, 31 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1041, 1055-56 (1999) (discussing IIRIRA's possible violation of the principal of
nonrefoulement and INS attempts to correct any violation).
8. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., DavidA. Martin, Two Cheers forExpeditedRemoval in the New Immigration
Laws, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 673, 680-82 (2000) (citing statistics to show that a small percentage
of aliens subject to expedited removal even ask for asylum hearings).
10. Id. at 681-82 (explainingthat the regulations require review and approval ofeach file
by a high-level supervisor to prevent an asylum-seeker from going undetected).
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This Note addresses the special problems that asylum-seekers
face under the expedited removal system, particularly with respect
to discrimination. The first section reviews the history of the
HRIRA and expedited removal. This history demonstrates that the
IIRIRA, and particularly the expedited removal system, was a
product of reactionary politics and pandering to general fears of
illegal immigration, rather than a well-reasoned response to the
problems facing immigration officials.'
The next section discusses the removal of any judicial review of
certain immigration decisions under the IIRIRA. In addition, this
section addresses the historic foundations for the general deference
afforded immigration decisions since the 1800s. Finally, this section
examines the availability of constitutional protections to non-
admitted aliens.
Section three discusses discrimination in United States immi-
gration law. This section first deals with historical discrimination
in general immigration law and in the asylum process. It then
examines the potential for discrimination in asylum law under the
expedited removal system and addresses the international law
implications of allowing discrimination in the asylum process. The
section concludes with a critique of the implementation of the
expedited removal system.
Finally, discussion turns to possible solutions to these problems
recently considered by Congress. Various efforts attempting to
reform the problems of the IIRIRA were introduced in the last
session of Congress. These reforms dealt with the problems of
expedited removal as applied to the asylum process. None of the
legislation introduced, however, went far enough. As this Note
ultimately concludes, in order to prevent the possibility of
discriminatory practices in asylum decisions, expedited removal
must not apply to potential asylum-seekers.
11. See infra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
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THE EXPEDITED REMOVAL SYSTEM
In the years leading up to the passage of the IIRIRA, several
events led to a backlog of asylum requests.' 2 Upheaval in Haiti and
Central and South America led to an influx of refugees seeking
escape from human rights violations and civil war. The location of
these countries made it easier for refugees to get to the United
States compared to refugees from the Soviet Bloc, Africa, and
Southeast Asia.'" The Refugee Act of 1980 compounded the
increased influx by loosening the requirements for those seeking
refugee status and increasing the numerical caps on yearly grants
of asylum."
In an effort to control illegal immigration, the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986's added a requirement thatimmigrants have work permits." Asylum applicants were granted
work permits while waiting for their cases to be heard." The INS
reasoned that this would allow an asylum applicant to begin to
establish a life in the United States rather than live in limbo while
awaiting judgment. 8 As a result, many illegal immigrants who
sought to receive a work permit filed an affirmative application for
asylum.'9 Neither the INS nor any of the administrations in power
took steps to increase the number of asylum officers."0 This lack of
personnel translated into an ever-increasing backlog of asylum
cases and resulted in a longer time period for review of asylum
12. PHILIP G. SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR 32-39 (2000).
13. See id. at 30.
14. Id. at 27-28. The 1980 Act adopted the United Nations definition of refugee in an
attempt to end discriminatory practices in refugee policies. Before the Act, asylum applicants
had to be from communist countries, totalitarian regimes, or certain countries in the Middle
East. Vaughns, supra note 2, at 59.
15. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
16. SCHRAG, supra note 12, at 31.
17. §§ 302-303, 100 Stat. 3359.
18. Id.
19. SCHRAG, supra note 12, at 31-36. Immigrants who sought to avoid deportation at
airports or borders could file a defensive asylum application. If an immigrant successfully
avoided detection upon entry, the affirmative application for asylum granted them a work
permit for the duration of the asylum adjudication. After the 1986 Act, work permits were
increasingly more difficult to obtain; the sole exception to this general rule was the
affirmative asylum application. Id.
20. Id.
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applications.2' The increase in time allowed individuals with false
asylum applications to work for a longer period of time before the
application could be reviewed and rejected, making it more and
more attractive for illegal immigrants to misuse the asylum
system.22
In addition to the backlog at the INS, several incidents led the
public to call for reform in the asylum system. For example, in
January 1993, two people were shot and killed near CIA
headquarters; the killer was an asylum applicant.24 In February the
World Trade Center was bombed. Several of the aliens charged with
committing that crime were asylum applicants.25 Finally, in March,
Sixty Minutes aired a report on asylum that described the ease with
which any alien with a passport could slip into the country and
disappear by claiming political asylum. The recession and
unemployment rates at the time made people suspicious of
immigrants coming to the United States and taking the jobs of
Americans, and these incidents heightened that suspicion.27 Calls
for reform led to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act' in 1996, followed closely by the IIRIRA the same year.
Under the IIRIRA, an alien who arrives on U.S. soil, either at a
land crossing or at an international airport, must pass through a
primary inspection.29 If the inspecting officer finds discrepancies in
the documents or has any questions or suspicions unresolvable in
the brief time allotted for the primary inspection, he must refer the
alien to a secondary inspection. 0 The secondary inspection requires
a careful interview, during which the alien has an opportunity to
21. Id.
22. Id. The earlier loosening of the rules and influx of refugees created a backlog at the
INS. Id. The backlog meant that adjudication of the affirmative asylum claim could take a
significant amount of time, during which the illegal immigrant had a work permit and could
establish himself in the United States. Id.
23. Id.
24. Caron, supra note 6, at 28.
25. Id.
26. AMNESTY: LOST, supra note 6, at 17-18.
27. SCHRAG, supra note 12, at 53.
28. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
29. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (2000).
30. MinnesotaAdvocatesforHumanRights,RefugeeandImmigrantProgram:Expedited
Removal and Credible Fear Determinations (2000) (on file with author).
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respond to charges of false or missing documents. 3' The second
immigration officer must also inform the alien of the possibility of
asylum and encourage the alien to speak up about any fear of
persecution.
3 2
Aliens who (1) fail to possess valid travel and/or visa documents,
or (2) possess false travel and/or visa documents are placed into
the expedited removal system. 3 In order to prevent immediate
deportation, such an alien must either indicate an intent to file for
asylum or express a fear of persecution.34 If the alien indicates an
intention to apply for asylum, the alien must be referred to an
asylum officer for further yeview.36
The asylum officer conducts an interview to determine whether
the alien has a credible fear of persecution.6 In order to prove a
credible fear, the alien must show a significant possibility that the
he would be able to win asylum. If the officer determines that
there is no credible fear, the alien is removed "without further
hearing or review,"38 unless he requests further review within a
specified amount of time.39 The review is limited in scope and must
take place within seven days of the officer's negative determination
of credible fear.4" At the hearing, the asylum-seeker cannot be
represented by counsel, although legal counsel may be present.4'
31. Martin, supra note 9, at 681.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(AXi).
35. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii).
36. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B). A credible fear interview involves ensuring that the alien
understands the process and "there is a significant possibility, taking into account the
credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien's claim and such other
facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum .... "Id.
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(v).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii).
39. Id. § 1225(bX1)(B)(iii)(III).
40. Id. Some commentators have expressed concern that this limited review could lead
to lawful residents being excluded from the United States accidentally. Home, supra note
5, at 30.
41. Michele R. Pistone, Assessing the Proposed Refugee Protection Act: One Step in the
Right Direction, 14 GEO. IMIWGR. L.J. 815, 821 (2000).
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JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER IIRIRA
One of the most criticized aspects of IIRIRA has been that it
severely limits any review of INS decisions.42 In the case of
expedited removal, IIRIRA effectively removes most forms of
judicial review for immigration decisions.4 Administrative review
of any decision is limited to an alien who declares, under oath, that
he "ha[s] been lawfully admitted for permanent residence,"" "ha[s]
been admitted as a refugee under section 1157,"" or he "ha[s] been
granted asylum under section 1158.""8 Finally, the Act removes
jurisdiction for collateral attacks based on the validity of any order
under the expedited removal system.47
As an administrative agency, INS decisions and policies are
granted a great deal of deference.4" Immigration law has also
been afforded extraordinary deference by the Supreme Court
under the plenary powers doctrine49 and the public rights
42. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts:
Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 Tx.F L.REV. 1615,1615 (2000) (discussing the pros and
cons of judicial review in immigration decisions and concluding that judicial review is a
necessary and important part of the system); Langenfeld, supra note 7, at 1061-63
(discussing the lack ofjudicial review under IIRIRA with regard to the mandatory detention
provisions of the Act). But see Paul S. Jones, Note, Immigration Reform: Congress Expedites
Illegal Alien Removal and Eliminates Judicial Review from the Exclusion Process, 21 NOVA
L. REV. 915, 915 (1997) (arguing that lack ofjudicial review does not violate due process).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(BXiii), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1XD).
44. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(C).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. § 1225(b)(1)(D).
48. When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute it administers, "[i]f the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). If the intent of Congress is
not clear, however, and Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, "there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute
by regulation." Id. at 843-44. Unless the agency's interpretation is "arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute," id. at 844, "a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency." Id.
49. In The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), the Court held that, even though
the Constitution did not explicitly vest in Congress the power to regulate immigration, the
power was inherent in Congress as "an incident of sovereignty." Id. The holding meant that
Congress had the power to control immigration and exclude immigrants as it saw fit. The
plenary powers doctrine is generally disliked among immigration law scholars. See, e.g.,
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doctrine.5" Such deference, coupled with the statute's explicit denial
of most forms of judicial review, indicates that Congress intended
to give the INS complete authority in determining whether an
applicant had a credible fear. The lack ofjudicial review could allow
an official or the agency as a whole to engage in discriminatory
treatment without any check by another branch.5
The lack of independent judicial review means that the only
recourse for an individual wishing to challenge a negative credible
fear determination is the agency review established in the INS
code.52 If the INS as an agency decides to engage in discriminatory
practices, the review procedures established under the IIRIRA will
not prevent it.
The danger to true asylum-seekers does not lie only in bad faith
discrimination. The determination of whether an individual has a
credible fear of persecution is based on any facts the asylum officer
deems to be relevant, in addition to what the alien tells him.5" In
part, this standard means information as to whether the United
States considers the country to be one that engages in torture or
other inhuman treatment, and the inspector's own knowledge of the
Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional
Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998) (arguing that the plenary power doctrine is
flawed because of the obvious racial bias of the cases and laws from which it was formulated);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Applying the Suspension Clause to Immigration Cases, 98 COLUM. L.
REv. 1068, 1089 (1998) (arguing that the plenary powers doctrine should be reformulated to
recognize that the plenary powers exist under the Constitution, and as such, are
constitutionally defined).
50. The public rights doctrine, first articulated in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (1 How.) 272 (1856), holds that Congress can "choose whether to
assign certain disputes between individuals and the government to courts or to executive
officials for resolution." Gerald R. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the
Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. Ray. 961, 1027 (1998). During the late 1800s, the Supreme
Court applied the public rights doctrine to immigration law in Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892). The Court held that the "decisions of executive or administrative
officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law." Id.
at 660. In other words, decisions of facts made by the INS or other duly appointed
immigration officials are final.
51. Such discriminatory practices would qualify as arbitrary and capricious, and
therefore, under Chevron would be open to judicial review. The nature of IIRIRA prevents
this, because courts are denied jurisdiction for collateral attacks based on any single denial.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(D).
52. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
53. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e) (2001).
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country's situation could govern the grant or denial of asylum.54
Therefore, one danger of this system is that people with novel
asylum claims and a real fear of persecution will not be able to meet
the credible fear determination.55 An additional danger arises when
the United States decides not to acknowledge a country's human
rights abuses, whether for economic or political reasons.6 In either
case, people facing a real threat of persecution in their homeland
could be denied asylum simply because the decision makers are not
well-informed and review procedures are too truncated to allow for
a full development of the alien's case.
One commentator also argues that a lack of judicial review
prevents any true independence in the process.5 Professor
54. Id.
55. For example, until recently, women from certain African countries who had a real
fear of female genital mutilation (or female circumcision), could be denied refugee status
because their persecution was not "on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion." Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, §
201(a)(42), 94 Stat. 102,102-03 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000)). The United States
was hesitant to allow an asylum claim based on gender, despite indications that gender did
fall under the membership in a "particular social group category." See, e.g., Safaie v. INS, 25
F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that gender did constitute a social group in case of
persecution); In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211 (1985) (interim decision 2986) (developing the
immutable characteristics test to define the social group category). This reluctance stemmed,
in part, from a fear that allowing gender persecution to become a category for refugee status
and asylum would open the floodgates to an enormous number of new claims. But see Layli
Miller Bashir, Female Genital Mutilation In The United States:An Examination of Criminal
and Asylum Law, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 415, 451-54 (1996) (refuting the floodgates
argument based on Canadian and French experience); John Linarelli, Violence and Culture
in the New International Order: Violence Against Women and the Asylum Process, 60 ALB.
L. REV. 977, 984-86 (1997) (refuting fears of opening the floodgates based on Canada's
experience, the stringency of American asylum law, and the difficulties facing a woman
attempting to flee the practice).
For a discussion of the history of using female genital mutilation as the basis for an
asylum claim, see generally Gregory A. Kelson, Female Circumcision in the Modern Age:
Should Female Circumcision Now be Considered Grounds forAsylum in the United States?,
4 BuFF. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 185, 209 (1998) (tracing the development of such claims in
immigration case law beginning in 1994 and concluding that 'the United States should take
the lead in protecting women against gender based persecutions ... worldwide"); Linda A.
Malone & Gillian Wood, International Decisions: In Re Kasinga, 91 AM. J. INI'L L. 140,146-
47 (1997) (holdingthatthis firstBoard of Immigration Appeals decision to use female genital
mutilation as grounds for asylum was a success for women's rights advocates, but not an
unqualified success, as many victims of this practice will still be barred from successfully
asserting a claim for asylum).
56. See infra notes 84-123 and accompanying text.
57. Legomsky, supra note 42, at 1615.
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Legomsky maintains that because the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) was created by the Attorney General, who also
appoints Board members and can reverse any decision the Board
makes, the judges of the BIA can never truly appear independent.58
The appearance of independence is necessary to ensure that no
indication of bias in important decisions exists.59
Using an example of a lawfully admitted permanent resident who
is being removed, Professor Legomsky further asserts that this
independence is especially important in immigration cases because
the stakes are so great.6" Although this is a strong case, the case
becomes stronger when considering the case of an alien seeking to
receive asylum because of persecution. An added benefit of judicial
review would be to inject a generalist's perspective into the process,
thus overcoming some of the biases, either against asylum
applicants in general or applicants from specific countries, that
inevitably build up in asylum officers over time." Although asylum
officers supposedly are trained to evaluate each claim objectively,
such biases are often unconscious, and therefore difficult to
overcome.
Constitutional Rights of Excludable Aliens
Because of the great deference afforded Congress and the INS,
excludable aliens are often deemed to have few, if any, enforceable
rights under the Constitution.6" The Supreme Court addressed the
issue of due process rights for excludable aliens in Knauff v.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1631.
61. Id. For an example of such bias, see Amnesty International, Amnesty International
Testimony on INS Detention: Before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 8 (Dec. 8, 2000)
(statement of Dr. William F. Schulz, Executive Director, Amnesty International USA)
[hereinafter Amnesty International Testimony], available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/
refugee/testiinony.pdf. Dr. Schulz discusses an asylum officer who, upon hearing that an
applicant's fear of persecution resulted from repeated beatings by Islamic extremists,
responded to an asylum request by stating, "I'm Muslim. What's your problem with
Muslims?" Although the applicant was ultimately granted asylum, he initially withdrew his
application because he felt intimidated by the officer. Id.
62. See Knauff v. Shagnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
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Shaugnessy.63 In Knauff, the Court reiterated that decisions
regarding the exclusion of aliens was a "fundamental act of
sovereignty," 4 and that the action of an executive officer is "final
and conclusive."" The Court further held that, no matter what its
authority to review a decision affecting an alien lawfully admitted
to the country, "it is not within the province of any court, unless
expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the
political branch of the Government to exclude a given alien."66
Finally, the Court explained, "[wlhatever the procedure authorized
by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned."67 In other words, Congress, not the Constitution,
determines due process for excludable aliens.
The Court affirmed this holdingin KwongHai Chew v. Colding.8
Kwong concerned the question of whether an admitted alien and
permanent resident of the United States, who left the country to
work on an American ship, could be excluded from the country upon
his return.69 The Court declined to follow Knauff, because the
petitioner was already a permanent resident of the country and
was, therefore, entitled to due process under the Constitution."° The
Court explained, however, that a Congressional authorization of a
denial of hearings did not conflict with the Constitution if applied
only to "excludable" aliens. 1 Again, the Court was essentially giving
Congress blanket authority over nonadmitted aliens.
A more recent case, Jean v. Nelson,7 2 calls this holding into
question. In an action brought by and on behalf of Haitian refugees
who were being kept in detention while their cases were pending,
the petitioners asserted a Fifth Amendment claim, charging that
63. Id.
64. Id. at 542.
65. Id at 543.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 544.
68. 344 U.S. 590 (1950).
69. Id. at 592-95.
70. Id. at 596-98.
71. Id. at 600; id. at 596 n.5 ("The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking
admission for the first time to these shores.") (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161
(1945) (Murphy, J., concurring)).
72. 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
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parole had been denied based on race or national origin.73 The
Eleventh Circuit held that such discrimination would not violate
the Fifth Amendment, based on the government's plenary powers
to control the nation's borders.74 Despite pressure from both sides
to reach the issue of whether the Fifth Amendment applies to
excludable aliens, the Supreme Court declined, holding that it was
sufficient to look to the nondiscrimination provisions in the INS's
own regulations.75 The dissent disagreed, holding that the
constitutional question should have been reached and decided for
the petitioners.76 Such a holding would have meant that the
Constitution does apply to excludable aliens, but because Marshall's
opinion is a dissent it holds no more weight than dicta.
Regardless of whether constitutional protections apply to
excludable aliens, a deeper problem arises in cases of aliens who
have been excluded despite a genuine claim for asylum. In such
cases, the alien is sent back to his country of origin.77 In theory, the
alien could appeal from home, but in cases of genuine persecution,
such a possibility is extremely unlikely. In addition, lack of money
on the alien's part could preclude, or at least limit, the scope of any
appeal.
Finally, in American Immigration Lawyers Ass'n v. Reno," the
D.C. Circuit held that immigration and human rights groups within
the United States lacked the standing to appeal an immigration
73. Id. at 848.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 853-57.
76. Id. at 858 (Marshall, J. dissenting). Marshall argued that the holding in Knauff
applied only to aliens excludable for national security reasons. Id. at 872. Marshall further
explained that the statement in Kwong Hai Chew that 'excludable' aliens ... are not within
the protection of the Fifth Amendment" was merely dicta, and thus "entitled to no more
deference than logic and principle would accord it.' Id. at 872-73 (citing Kwong Hai Chew,
344 U.S. at 600 (1953)). Marshall then concluded that, even with regard to entry decisions,
excludable aliens do enjoy certain constitutional protections, and that "[tihe proper
constitutional inquiry must concern the scope of the equal protection and due process rights
at stake, and not whether the Due Process Clause can be invoked at all." Id. at 876-77.
Because Marshall's opinion is a dissent, it holds no more weight than he ascribes to the dicta
in Kwong Hai Chew; however, combined with the refusal of the majority to reach the issue,
it does leave the question of whether the constitution is applicable to excludable aliens still
somewhat unsettled.
77. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2000).
78. 18 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 1998).
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decision for an excluded alien. 9 This leaves excluded aliens with a
genuine asylum claim no recourse and harms the very people the
United States should be protecting.
DISCRIMINATION IN IMMIGRATION LAW
The lack of any review in immigration decisions is especially
problematic considering the history of discriminatory exclusionary
policies of the United States. The Chinese Exclusion Act ° was the
first example of the United States government using discriminatory
principles to define immigration patterns. Although much of the
discrimination was initially aimed at Asian immigrants, the acts
were also used to prevent a huge influx of Jewish refugees from
Europe during Hitler's reign." Immigration law would continue to
follow this new patternS2 until 1965, when national quotas were
abolished in the immigration system."
79. Id
80. Act of May 6,1882, ch. 126,6,22 Stat. 58,60 (as amended by the Act of July 5, 1884,
ch. 220,23 Stat. 115) (repealed 1943) (allowing exclusion and deportation of immigrants from
China despite existing treaties).
81. In the eleven years between 1933 and 1944, the United States admitted about
250,000 European refugees, most of them Jewish, an average of 22,000 per year. SCHRAG,
supra note 12, at 22. That number amounted to about forty percent of the German quota, and
resulted from a combination of restrictionist policies, economic concerns due to the Great
Depression, and Anti-Semitism on the part of the American public and members of the
United States government. See id. at 21-22.
82. See, e.g., Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29,39 Stat. 874,876 (repealed 1952) (banning
virtually all immigration from Asia); Immigration Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5
(amended by Act of May 11, 1922, ch. 187,42 Stat. 540 (1922)) (repealed 1943) (limiting the
number of immigrants to a percentage of the current number of legal residents in the United
States of that nationality, perpetuating the previous discrimination of the immigration
system); National Origins Act of 1924, ch. 190,43 Stat. 153,154 (banning the admittance of
all aliens ineligible for citizenship). For a more detailed accounting of discriminatory
practices in general immigration law, see LucY E. SAYLER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS (1995)
(describing discriminatory practices toward Chinese immigrants); SCHRAG, supra note 12,
at 17-36 (describing discriminatory practices in immigration law in general); William L.
Pham, Note, Section 633 of HRIRA" Immunizing Discrimination in Immigrant Visa
Processing, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1468-72 (1998) (describing discriminatory practices
towards Asians in the immigration process throughout history).
83. See Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 201(e), 79 Stat. 911 (ending the quota
system in immigration as of June 30, 1968). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
codified all immigration laws into one Act, but retained the discriminatory quota system.
See Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 169 (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1503 (2000)). The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 abolished
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Refugee and Asylum Law: A History of Using Asylum as a
Political Rather Than Humanitarian Tool
As a unique subset of immigration law, refugee law has
developed along a separate path, but it has retained the
discriminatory leanings that were present in eighteenth and
nineteenth century immigration law.84 Furthermore, asylum and
refugee status have been used consistently as a method of
embarrassing the ideological enemies of the United States. 5 Laws
governing admittance of refugees generally were enacted in
response to an emergency or crisis and not meant to be used as a
precedent or viewed as a commitment to helping refugees. 6
Congress made exceptions to the restrictive immigration laws only
in order to "discharge responsibilities towards persons uprooted by
the war, or as a gesture to the anti-communist preoccupation of the
Cold War Era.""
The Refugee Relief Act of 195388 allowed admission of refugees
escaping natural disaster as well as those from Communist Europe
and the Middle East.89 The Act expired in 1956-the same year that
the Soviet Union invaded Hungary in order to end reform taking
place in that country.9 ° President Eisenhower decided that a
statement had to be made, and offered asylum to 21,500 Hungarian
the quota system and created a more equitable system of immigration, based both on a per
country limit and a preference system based on the immigrant's own ties to the United
States. See Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 201(e), 79 Stat. 911.
84. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
85. Carolyn Patty Blum, A Question ofValues: ContinuingDivergences Between U.S. and
International Refugee Norms, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 38, 42-46 (1997) (citing as examples
of discriminatory treatment in U.S. refugee history the different treatments of refugees from
Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Haiti).
86. Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis:A Legislative History
of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1981).
87. Id. at 13. For example, the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 gave sanctuary only to
displaced forced laborers from States conquered by Nazi Germany and certain refugees who
qualified under the United Nations standards for refugees. The Displaced Persons Act of
1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009. The allowance for those refugees who met the UN
standard for refugees was typically limited to those refugees who had fled Nazi or Fascist
persecution or who were fleeing Communist persecution. Anker & Posner, supra note 86, at
13.
88. Pub. L. No. 203, 67 Stat. 400.
89. Anker & Posner, supra note 86, at 14.
90. Id. at 14-15.
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decision for an excluded alien.79 This leaves excluded aliens with a
genuine asylum claim no recourse and harms the very people the
United States should be protecting.
DISCRIMINATION IN IMMIGRATION LAW
The lack of any review in immigration decisions is especially
problematic considering the history of discriminatory exclusionary
policies of the United States. The Chinese Exclusion Act80 was the
first example of the United States government using discriminatory
principles to define immigration patterns. Although much of the
discrimination was initially aimed at Asian immigrants, the acts
were also used to prevent a huge influx of Jewish refugees from
Europe during Hitler's reign." Immigration law would continue to
follow this new pattern 2 until 1965, when national quotas were
abolished in the immigration system.8"
79. Id
80. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126,6,22 Stat. 58,60 (as amended by the Act of July 5, 1884,
ch. 220,23 Stat. 115) (repealed 1943) (allowing exclusion and deportation ofimmigrants from
China despite existing treaties).
81. In the eleven years between 1933 and 1944, the United States admitted about
250,000 European refugees, most of them Jewish, an average of 22,000 per year. SCHRAG,
supra note 12, at 22. That number amounted to about forty percent of the German quota, and
resulted from a combination of restrictionist policies, economic concerns due to the Great
Depression, and Anti-Semitism on the part of the American public and members of the
United States government. See id. at 21-22.
82. See, e.g., Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874,876 (repealed 1952) (banning
virtually all immigration from Asia); Immigration Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5
(amended by Act of May 11, 1922, ch. 187,42 Stat. 540 (1922)) (repealed 1943) (limiting the
number of immigrants to a percentage of the current number of legal residents in the United
States of that nationality, perpetuating the previous discrimination of the immigration
system); National Origins Act of 1924, ch. 190,43 Stat. 153, 154 (banning the admittance of
all aliens ineligible for citizenship). For a more detailed accounting of discriminatory
practices in general immigration law, see LUCY E. SAYLER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS (1995)
(describing discriminatory practices toward Chinese immigrants); SCHRAG, supra note 12,
at 17-36 (describing discriminatory practices in immigration law in general); William L.
Pham, Note, Section 633 of IIRZRA. Immunizing Discrimination in Immigrant Visa
Processing, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1461, 1468-72 (1998) (describing discriminatory practices
towards Asians in the immigration process throughout history).
83. See Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 201(e), 79 Stat. 911 (ending the quota
system in immigration as of June 30, 1968). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
codified all immigration laws into one Act, but retained the discriminatory quota system.
See Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 169 (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1503 (2000)). The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 abolished
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Refugee and Asylum Law: A History of Using Asylum as a
Political Rather Than Humanitarian Tool
As a unique subset of immigration law, refugee law has
developed along a separate path, but it has retained the
discriminatory leanings that were present in eighteenth and
nineteenth century immigration law.84 Furthermore, asylum and
refugee status have been used consistently as a method of
embarrassing the ideological enemies of the United States." Laws
governing admittance of refugees generally were enacted in
response to an emergency or crisis and not meant to be used as a
precedent or viewed as a commitment to helping refugees.86
Congress made exceptions to the restrictive immigration laws only
in order to "discharge responsibilities towards persons uprooted by
the war, or as a gesture to the anti-communist preoccupation of the
Cold War Era.""
The Refugee Relief Act of 19538 allowed admission of refugees
escaping natural disaster as well as those from Communist Europe
and the Middle East.89 The Act expired in 1956-the same year that
the Soviet Union invaded Hungary in order to end reform taking
place in that country.9 ° President Eisenhower decided that a
statement had to be made, and offered asylum to 21,500 Hungarian
the quota system and created a more equitable system of immigration, based both on a per
country limit and a preference system based on the immigrant's own ties to the United
States. See Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 201(e), 79 Stat. 911.
84. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
85. Carolyn Patty Blum, A Question of Values: ContinuingDiergencesBetween U.S. and
International Refugee Norms, 15 BERKELEY J. INTVL L. 38, 42-46 (1997) (citing as examples
of discriminatory treatment in U.S. refugee history the different treatments of refugees from
Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Haiti).
86. Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis:A Legislative History
of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1981).
87. Id. at 13. For example, the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 gave sanctuary only to
displaced forced laborers from States conquered by Nazi Germany and certain refugees who
qualified under the United Nations standards for refugees. The Displaced Persons Act of
1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009. The allowance for those refugees who met the UN
standard for refugees was typically limited to those refugees who had fled Nazi or Fascist
persecution or who were fleeing Communist persecution. Anker & Posner, supra note 86, at
13.
88. Pub. L. No. 203, 67 Stat. 400.
89. Anker & Posner, supra note 86, at 14.
90. Id at 14-15.
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In addition to expanding the definition of refugee, the Act also set
out specific provisions for refugees who reached America's shores,
bringing American law in line with the United Nations Protocol of
1967.107 Under the Act, "withholding of deportation" for refugees
was mandatory.' In other words, a refugee could not be returned
to a country in which his life was in danger.109 The Act also gave the
Attorney General discretion to grant asylum to any refugee,
allowing the refugee to move on with his life rather than to live in
continual uncertainty about his status.10 Immigrants who arrived
at borders or airports without documents, or with suspicious or
fraudulent documents, were immediately placed in removal
proceedings before an immigration judge.1 ' At the hearing, the
alien could raise asylum as an affirmative defense to deportation."
With the election of Ronald Reagan and the beginning of the
1980s, American refugee and asylum law again began to be used to
promote American foreign policy rather than for humanitarian
goals."8 Applicants for asylum from the United States' cold war
enemies were granted asylum as a matter of course." 4 There was
no better way to try to embarrass American enemies than by
releasing statistics showing that a large number of the people
needing asylum were from communist countries." 5
On the other hand, refugees from countries such as Haiti and El
Salvador did not fair as well."' Despite widespread international
107. Cf id., with Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1961,606 U.N.T.S.
267.
108. SCERAG, supra note 12, at 28.
109. Id. "The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country ifthe
Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such
country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or
political opinion." § 203(e), 94 Stat. at 107 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000)).
110. SCHRAG, supra note 12, at 28.
111. Michele R. Pistone, Assessing the Proposed Refugee Protection Act: One Step in the
Right Direction, 14 GEO. IMMIGI L.J. 815,820 (2000).
112. Id.
113. Seegenerally IraJ.Kurzban,RestructuringtheAsylumProcess, 19SANDIEGoL.REv.
91, 94-95 (1981) (describing the changes that the Reagan administration proposed for the
asylum and immigration process).
114. See SCHRAG, supra note 12, at 28-29.
115. Id.; see also Kurzban, supra note 113, at 102-03 (describing the use of asylum to
pursue political ends prior to the 1980 Refugee Act).
116. For example, in fiscal year 1983, the INS granted asylum to seventy-eight percent
of Russian applicants and forty-four percent of Romanian applicants. SCHRAG, supra note 12,
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knowledge that these regimes engaged in torture and persecution,
the United States supported these governments and had no wish to
embarrass them.117 Refugees from these countries, therefore, were
regularly denied asylum because the INS deemed them to be
escaping economic hardship, not true persecution.
118
Critics of United States refugee policy echoed this concern
regarding the true nature of that policy in the 1990s, when public
opinion began to turn against the blanket admission of Cuban
refugees. In response to public concerns, the United States began
to limit the number of Cubans admitted each year; the United
States would issue a set number of visas, and any Cuban rafters
picked up at sea would be taken to a refugee center at either
Guantanamo Bay or in Panama City."9 This policy was enunciated
in a joint statement issued by Cuba and the United States on May
2, 1995.120 This approach earned the criticism that, again, the
at 29. In contrast, only two percent of Haitian applicants and three percent of Salvadoran
applicants had their applications approved. Id.; see also Blum, supra note 85, at 42-45. The
divergent treatment of Haitian and Cuban refugees serves as an example. The United States
Coast Guard physically prevented Haitian refugee boats from reaching United States waters
during the Junta regime of 1991-1994, without ever determining whether any of the
passengers were bona fide refugees. See Blum, supra note 85, at 44-45. The Supreme Court
held that this was not a violation of nonrefoulement, because the boats never reached
American territory. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). On the other
hand, boatloads of Cubans were allowed to enter American territory and were granted special
legal rights. See Blum, supra note 85, at 45.
117. In addition to not wishing to embarrass these nations, the United States did not wish
to appear to be supporting repressive regimes. See generally McBride, supra note 100, at 4-6.
Granting of asylum to individuals from these countries would be an indictment of their
governments, and by extension, an indictment of the United States for supporting the
governments in the first place. Id.
118. See Kurzban, supra note 113, at 95.
119. McBride, supra note 100, at 6.
120. Office of the Press Secretary of the White House, Joint Statement of the United
States and the Republic of Cuba (May 2, 1995), available at http'//clinton6.nara.gov/1995/05/
1995-05-02-joint-us-cuban-statement-on-migration.html. This policy later became known as
the "feet-wet, feet-dry" rule. See Karen De Young, U.S., Cuba Discuss Immigration Pact:
Washington and Havana at Odds on Smuggling, Return of Illegal Migrants, WASH. POST,
Dec. 13, 1999, at A19.
The policy was adopted in an attempt to end the "rafter crisis" of 1994, during which the
coast of Florida experienced a huge influx of Cuban refugees. The United States'Inconsistent
and Confusing Immigration Policy Towards Cuba has a Little Boy Caught in an
International Tug of War, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 19, 1999, at 1G. This
policy put the United States Coast Guard in the position of enforcing Cuba's law that
prohibits emigration without government approval. See id. More recently, however, Cuba has
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United States was looking at domestic or foreign policy concerns in
making refugee determinations, rather than at the underlying
humanitarian concerns.'2 The policy had another, unintended
effect: The United States essentially contracted with Cuba to deny
Cubans the right to leave their country.'22 This action violated the
United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which
gives every person "the right to leave any country, including his
own.
" 1 23
The granting of asylum throughout history has been based in
part on foreign policy considerations and public prejudices.
Expedited removal, because of the lack of review and corresponding
lack of transparency in the system could easily be used to hide such
facts from international monitors and the general public. The
United States accepts the principle that "[elveryone has the right
to seek and enjoy asylum if they are forced to flee their country to
escape persecution;" 124 the spirit of asylum and refugee standards
are to protect those in danger of persecution, not promote a political
ideology.
International Law Obligations Regarding Discrimination in the
Granting of Asylum
In general, international law plays a very small role in American
domestic law. The United States considers international law to
govern states, not human beings. 1' As such, unless the United
States has enacted implementing legislation for a treaty,"
begun to criticize the policy as encouraging illegal immigration, especially after the recent,
highly publicized Elian Gonzalez case. See DeYoung, supra; see also David Adams, Desperate
Cuban Rafters on the Rise, THE PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.), Oct. 20, 1999, at 22.
121. McBride, supra note 100, at 6.
122. Id.
123. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, art. 13(2), U.N. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc.
A/010 (1948).
124. Amnesty International Testimony, supra note 61, at 1.
125. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 101 (1987). The exception to the rule of states as subjects of international law are areas
such as human rights; individuals are increasingly recognized as the subject of these rights
and may have individual causes of action. Id. § 703(3), cmt. c.
126. Under American interpretation, treaties are deemed to be non-self-executing and
have no immediate effect upon ratification. Id. §§ 303 cmt. d, 312 cmt. j. In order to have an
effect, Congress must consent to it. Id.
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international law is not used as a basis for litigation or a standard
for our own laws. This is not the case in immigration law. The
United States explicitly adopted the definition of a refugee from the
U.N. Convention in drafting the Refugee Act of 1980.127 Moreover,
immigration lawyers and judges consistently rely on international
standards in these cases.
In the aftermath of World War II, the international community
was faced with a massive refugee problem. In an attempt to deal
with the problem, the United Nations ratified the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees. 12 The United States was not
originally a party to the treaty, but was a party to the later Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees.'29 The Protocol adopted all of the
substantive provisions of the Convention' but modified the
definition of refugee to include all refugees, not just those who
became refugees as a result of World War II.' A refugee is defined
as
any person who ... owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear,
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country
132
Under the Protocol, the parties are obligated not to "expel or
return ('refouler') a refugee ... to the frontiers of territories where
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
127. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
128. July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
129. Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
130. See id. art. 1.
131. See id. art. 1(2). In the Convention refugee was defined in part as "any person who
... [a]s a result of events occurring before January 1, 1951 ... is outside the country of his
nationality ... or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events .... " Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1(A), 189 U.N.T.S. 150. The Protocol dropped the "[als a result
of events occurring before January 1, 1951" and "as a result of such events," from the
definition. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
132. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. l(A)(2), 189
U.N.T.S. 150.
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religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion. " ' The use of expedited removal in cases of aliens
claiming asylum could easily violate this provision, especially
considering the lack of review afforded to any single claim."3 4
The Convention Against Torture also prohibits the refouler of
persons to states in which they may be subject to torture.3 5 The
Convention directs Contracting States to make determinations
about whether there are "substantial grounds for believing"3 6 that
a person would be in such danger by "tak[ing] into account all
relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence
in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or
mass violations of human rights."' Under the expedited removal
system, an INS agent could deem a fear of persecution to be
noncredible if it is not well known that a country engages in
torture, and in so doing, could be violating the Convention. The
United States has ratified this treaty, but it has not yet passed
implementing legislation. Because the United States deems
international treaties to be non-self-executing, the United States
may be under no legal obligation to follow it.
38
Two considerations, however, will keep the United States from
consciously violating the treaty. First, prohibitions on torture are
considered a jus cogens norm of international law."3 9 This means
that they are super-norms, and as such are applicable to all
countries whether the are party to a treaty or not.140 By extension,
prohibitions on returning a refugee to face torture also becomes a
jus cogens norm. Second, even if the return of a potential victim of
torture would not violate ajus cogens norm, the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment is not a treaty that the United States wants to be
accused of violating. If nothing else, it is bad public relations.
133. Id. art. 33.
134. For more extensive treatment of this issue, see Crowe, supra note 7, at 291.
135. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., pt. 1, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A139/46 (1984).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
702(d) & cmt. n (1987).
140. Id. §§ 702 cmt. n, 102 cmt. k.
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The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees also requires
signatory States to apply the provisions of the Convention "without
discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin."' In theory,
this means that the United States cannot discriminate on any
grounds when deciding whether a person is a refugee and whether
to admit that person, either through asylum or by simply
withholding of expulsion." 2 However, the initial denial of asylum in
expedited removal proceedings is left to low-level INS officials and
subject only to approval by supervisor. 4" Such an official may
decide someone is not credible on subjective factors having nothing
to do with an applicant's actual situation.
In addition to personal prejudices, national policy plays into the
decision not to grant asylum. Asylum officers are informed of
countries that are deemed to engage in torture, but that process
itself depends on the United States' recognition of a country as one
that engages in torture or other inhuman treatment.'" If the
United States, for trade reasons or reasons of foreign relations, fails
to list a country as one that engages in such behavior, an asylum
officer may find no credible fear even if one truly exists. This
finding would result in the expedited removal system being used to
promote political ends, rather than the protection of human rights,
violating the spirit, if not the language of the protocol. The same
holds true for current situations that might give rise to refugees
and asylum-seekers. 4 ' Leaving the decision to admit or deny a
potential refugee in the hands of a very small number of
immigration officials, without any substantial review, leaves
141. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1957, art. 3, 189 U.N.T.S.
150.
142. See id.
143. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B) (2000).
144. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text; see also Susan Aschoff, The Politics
ofImmigration, FLORIDIAN, Dec. 21, 1997, at IF.
145. In the aftermath ofthe terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, lawyers for Arab and
Muslim applicants for Green Cards say that their clients have faced increased scrutiny. Eric
Schmitt, Backlog and Wait for Green Card Declines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2002, at A12. No
actual discriminatory practices have been alleged, but the increased questioning has been
noticeable. Id. As one immigration lawyer put it, "'It may be an unspoken type of thing,' ....
The I.N.S. may have Sept. 11 in the back of their minds.'" Id. (quoting Ashraf Nubani, an
immigration lawyer in Virginia). Despite any actual discrimination so far, such an
unconscious bias could easily carry over to asylum applicants.
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potential asylees open to discriminatory treatment without any
recourse.
One commentator holds that expedited removal does not violate
international standards towards refugees."" Professor Martin
explains that the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
does not exclude, and in fact allows, summary proceedings in an
asylum setting.147 He states the UNHCR's views on the subject of
summary exclusion as noting that "national procedures 'may
usefully include special provision for dealing in an expeditious
manner with applications which are considered to be so obviously
without foundation as not to merit full examination at every level
of procedure.'"
Upon examination, however, Professor Martin's analysis does not
hold up. The UN statement allows a form of expedited removal
when claims are manifestly unfounded."' In contrast, the expedited
removal system's credible fear determination is a higher standard.
To be removed from the expedited removal system, an alien must
show that there is a substantial likelihood that he will be able to
apply successfully for asylum.50 Manifestly unfounded, the
standard allowed by the U.N., indicates that the claim must be false
on its face, not merely unlikely or difficult to prove.
Expedited Removal in Practice
The expedited removal system was an attempt by Congress to
handle the backlog of asylum cases and to stem the flow of illegal
immigration.' 5 ' According to the INS, between August 1, 1997 and
September 30, 1998, 160,000 immigrants were subject to expedited
removal. 5 ' Of that number, half withdrew their applications for
146. Martin, supra note 9, at 692.
147. Id.
148. Id. (quoting UNCHR EXCOM Conclusion 30 (XXXIV), The Problem of Manifestly
Unfounded or Abusive Applications for Refugee Status or Asylum (1983) (emphasis added),
available at http//www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bintexis/vtxhome).
149. See id.
150. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2000).
151. See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
152. Immigration and Naturalization Service, FY 1998 Update on Expedited Removals
(June 21, 1999), available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/text/publicaffairs/factsheets/
expedite.htm.
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admission, while approximately 3000 expressed some fear of
returning home and were referred for a credible fear interview.'
Eighty-six percent of those referred to credible fear interviews met
the standard and were taken out of the expedited removal
system. 154 In contrast, ninety-two percent of those removed through
the expedited removal process were Mexican, lending credence to
the idea that the system will stem the flow of illegal immigration
from southern borders. 155
The problem with placing any possible asylees into the expedited
removal system, however, is not solved simply because the numbers
involved are small; in any given year the number of asylees is
small. The problems stem from the true refugee's lack of
reviewability after being rejected from the system, coupled with the
inadequacy of the system to deal with new forms or sources of
persecution. In addition, the United States is still a superpower; as
such, other nations look to the United States as a gauge for their
actions. If the United States limits the entrance of refugees, other
nations may follow suit."'5 Finally, the consequences of error are too
great. Not only would returning a true refugee to a country in which
he will be subject to persecution be a violation of international law,




155. Id. Using expedited removal to remove illegal aliens not seeking asylum still raises
questions about due process and constitutional guarantees. However, because of the Court's
past treatment of aliens and questions of constitutional protections, expedited removal in this
situation is not as problematic. See supra notes 35-74 and accompanying text. A full
examination of the application of expedited review in nonasylum cases is outside the scope
of this Note.
156. See, e.g., Ralph Begleiter, Massacre May Ultimately Speed Up Mideast Peace Process
(CNN television broadcast, Feb. 25, 1995), available at LEXIS, Allnews File ("The U.S. can't
avoid it. It's the only remaining super power.... Everyone turns to the U.S. for an opinion,
for mediation.").
157. "Deportees are not monitored by the U.S. Embassy or by human rights monitors.
There is no adequate security protection for returnees to ensure that they are not beaten or
worse when they return to their villages or towns." 139 Cong. Rec. H1151-52 (daily ed. Mar.
10, 1993) (statement of Rep. Meek) (discussing the plight of Haitian refugees who are
deported).
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POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
In response to concerns that legitimate applicants for asylum
were being turned away, a bipartisan group of Senators introduced
legislation during the 106th session of Congress. These bills
attempted to limit the scope of the expedited removal procedure and
to correct the problems inherent in its application.
The first of these bills, the Refugee Protection Act of 1999
(RPA), 5" would have limited the application of the expedited
removal system to times during which the Attorney General
determined that an extraordinary migration situation existed."5 9 An
extraordinary migration situation was defined as "the arrival orimminent arrival in the United States or its territorial waters of
aliens who by their numbers or circumstances substantially exceed
the capacity for inspection and examination of such aliens." 60
Even during a declared "extraordinary migration situation,"
expedited removal would not have applied to certain aliens. 6 '
Aliens from countries that had been designated as engaging in
various human rights abuses, including torture, arbitrary
detention, and systematic persecution, as well as aliens from
countries involved in an ongoing conflict, would be exempt.'62 This
exception would have covered situations like the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia. In addition, aliens who were natives or citizens
of a country with whom the United States did not have full
diplomatic relations would have been exempt from expedited
removal.'63 This exemption would have covered women escaping
from gender apartheid that occurred under the former Taliban
regime in Afghanistan. Finally, children unaccompanied by a
parent or guardian would also have been exempt from the
system. 164 This last exemption was in response to human rights
158. S. 1940, 106th Cong. (1999).
159. Id. § 3(a)(2), 235(b)(1)(A).
160. Id. §§ 3(a)(2), 235(b)(1)(A)(ii).
161. Id.
162. Id. §§ 3(c), 235(b)(1)(G)(i).
163. Id. §§ 3(c), 235(b)(1)(G)(ii).
164. Id. §§ 3(c), 235(b)(1)(G)(iii).
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groups' criticisms of treatment of children in the immigration
system.1
65
Under the RPA, an extraordinary migration situation would have
been valid for ninety days, which could be extended for additional
ninety-day periods after consultation with the Senate and House
Judiciary Committees. 66 One commentator noted, however, that
the ambiguous nature of the statutory provision, coupled with the
broad discretion given to the Attorney General, could have allowed
an "extraordinary migration situation" to be declared for the
southern border. 6 ' This situation would be outside of the drafters'
intent, but would be in the INS's interest. 68 The INS is evaluated
in large part by the number of people it removes from the United
States each year;'69 it is therefore in the INS's interest to continue
the policy if at all possible. 70 In addition, 1999 saw a decrease in
asylum applications, due in part to the expedited removal system. 171
Although the decrease will allow the INS to clear some of the
backlog it is currently experiencing, the danger is that true
refugees, who otherwise would have applied for asylum, are being
denied asylum in the new process and returned home to face
further persecution.
The RPA also would have limited expedited removal to those
aliens with no documents or facially invalid documents. 17 This
would have decreased the amount of leeway INS inspectors have in
finding that facially valid documents were obtained through fraud.
Although this limitation was sound, the RPA failed to take into
account the fact that many genuine refugees may not have
documents because the documents were destroyed by their
persecutors or because they have had to obtain false documents in
165. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Detained and Deprived ofRights, at http://www.hrw.
org/hrw/reports98/ins2/berks98d.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2002).
166. See S. 1940, §§ 3(a)(2), 235(b)(1)(A)(iv).
167. Pistone, supra note 41, at 829.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 830.
171. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Refugees, Asylees, Fiscal Year 1999, at 8
(attributing an eighteen percent decline in applications to a decrease in filings by nationals
of Guatemala, El Salvador, India, and Mexico), at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins
statistics/ 99YrbkBEF/RA99list.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2002).
172. S. 1940, §§ 3(b), 235(b)(1)(BXi).
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order to flee the country safely. 3 The very people asylum was
designed to protect still would have been subject to the expedited
removal system.
The RPA also broadened the credible fear definition, requiring
that the claim "is not clearly fraudulent and is related to the
criteria for granting asylum" 74 rather than requiring a "significant
possibility... [of] eligibility for asylum."'75 This would have allowed
more genuine applicants for asylum to meet the criteria and present
their case before an immigration judge. It also would have brought
INS policy in line with the U.N. policy on the use of an expedited
removal system.76 Finally, the RPA would have reformed the
review procedure, requiring the Attorney General to provide for
prompt review by an immigration judge of a negative credible fear
determination. 77 The review would have taken place in person and
would have allowed the alien to be represented by counsel at the
government's expense.
178
The RPA was based on an amendment offered and passed in the
Senate during the original passage of the IIRIRA. 79 A later bill, the
Immigrant Fairness Restoration Act of 2000,80 would have limited
the use of expedited removal to aliens seeking admission. 8' These
improvements would have been important, as they would have
prevented the use of expedited removal in asylum situations in
most instances, and prevented the use of expedited removal for
immigrants already admitted to the United States. They never
made it out of committee before the 106th session of Congress
ended, however, and have not yet been reintroduced.
These bills would not have prevented the INS from enforcing an
asylum agenda based on foreign politics rather than on true fear of
173. See, e.g., Jules Witcover, America Lagging as Refugee Haven, BALT. SUN., June 18,
2001, at 7A ("Refugees by the very nature of their flight often have no such papers, their
departures having been entirely voluntary, if you can call threats to their lives as leaving
voluntarily.").
174. S. 1940, §§ 3(e), 235(b)(1)(C)(v).
175. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1)(B)(v) (2000).
176. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
177. S. 1940, §§ 3(d), 235(b)(1)(C)(iii).
178. Id.
179. Domestic Violence Cases intheAsylumProcess, 146 CONG. REC. S8752 (daily ed. Sept.
19,2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
180. S. 3120, 106th Cong. (2000).
181. Id. § 3.
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persecution. In addition, many true refugees may not know to ask
for asylum or they may be too scared or embarrassed to discuss the
fears they have and the dangers they may face.'82 Even though INS
officers are supposed to be trained to recognize all kinds of signals
indicating fear, including body language," officers may make
mistakes. Judicial review would create an additional safeguard to
ensure that the INS is not returning people to persecution. Until a
full degree of judicial review is permitted for aliens who fail the
credible fear determination, expedited removal must not be applied
to aliens seeking asylum or refugee status.
Congress implemented the IIRIRA as a result of negative public
opinion about illegal immigration and asylum, a backlog of asylum
cases at the INS, world events that created severe influxes of
refugees, and an effort by Congress to prevent illegal immigration
from Mexico and other Central and Latin American Countries."
Rather than continue to use a plan that potentially violates
international norms, however, the INS should try to correct the
original problem.
The backlog of asylum applications occurred, in part, because of
faulty legislation coupled with a shortage of asylum officers. Rather
than implement more faulty legislation, the obvious solution would
have been to hire and train more asylum officers.'85 Congress
should now repeal the IIRIRA, or at least insert a provision
completely exempting those seeking asylum from the system. This
may lead to an initial backlog of asylum cases. The fact that, under
IIRIRA, asylum applicants are detained in prisons until their cases
are decided should prevent most false claims. 86
182. Pistone, supra note 41, at 824-25 (discussing difficulties asylum seekers face).
183. Martin, supra note 9, at 681-82 (describing the training and process used in
evaluating asylum applicants).
184. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
185. In 2001, the backlog of applicants for Green Cards decreased for the first time since
1994, in part because the INS has hired 1200 more adjudicators in the last three years.
Schmitt, supra note 145. If this trend continues and the decline increases, the necessity of
applying expedited removal in any asylum situation will be eliminated.
186. See generally Pistone, supra note 6 (discussing the INS policy of detention of asylum
applicants for the duration of the adjudication process). The initial backlog of asylum
applicants stemmed, in part, from the INS policy of granting work visas to applicants while
their cases were being reviewed, a process that took up to two years. See supra notes 15-20
and accompanying text. Mandatory detention of asylum applicants should prevent most false
claims. Problems with this policy have been discussed at length by various commentators
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In addition to changes in the legislation itself, the asylum process
must be subject to judicial review. The best response to criticism
about discriminatory treatment in any process is transparency;
judicial review will lend that transparency to immigration law. The
alien should have access to a translator, and representation by an
attorney during any review. The asylum process must take into
account the mental state of true refugees. Finally, asylum officers
must be well-versed in the potential for persecution all over the
world, not simply within countries deemed to be enemies of the
United States.
CONCLUSION
Expedited removal does seem successful in preventing some of
the illegal immigration that takes place through America's southern
border. Denying judicial review to immigrants who do not wish to
seek asylum is still problematic because of due process concerns.
The difference, however, is in the result of the lack of review for
asylum applicants. A potential immigrant who is seeking to
improve his economic opportunity by coming to the United States
will lose that opportunity if placed into the expedited removal
system. The immigrant will also be prevented from reentering the
United States for five years.'87 Despite America's beginnings as a
nation of immigrants, however, public opinion and economic
considerations have led to the implementation of immigration laws.
These laws permit the denial of admittance to certain aliens, based
on quotas or other considerations. The exception to these laws must
be for those fleeing persecution, and each potential refugee must be
given a fair chance to prove his or her credible fear. Anything less
renders any asylum policy meaningless.
Erin M. O'Callaghan
and are beyond the scope of this Note. See generally supra notes 12-23 and accompanying
text.
187. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2000).
